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BOOK REVIEWS

interesting questions for covert operations of the future.

Tom Brokaw has called “the greatest
generation.”

If this were all The Secret War against
Hanoi accomplished, it would be a significant contribution to our understanding of
the Vietnam conflict, thereby earning a
place on our bookshelves. But Shultz has
also performed a long overdue and badly
needed service in recognizing the tremendous human cost associated with
SOG’s operations. The casualty figures
are simply staggering. For example, of
approximately five hundred agents placed
in North Vietnam, apparently all were
killed or captured; some were “doubled.”
Only slightly less appalling are the casualty rates suffered by the U.S.-led reconnaissance teams that operated against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. The worst year was
1969, in which counter-trail operations
in Laos experienced a 50 percent casualty
rate. It is only fitting that the danger
these soldiers faced and the sacrifices
they made be part of the public record
of the Vietnam War.

Although Bradley is neither a strategist
nor a military historian, he understands
the significance of Iwo Jima and places it
properly in the context of World War II.
This is not revisionist historiography.
Bradley solidly affirms Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb to save
American—and Japanese—lives, because
the alternative would have been even
more horrific. The author’s depiction of
the training regimen, camaraderie, and
exploits of the U.S. Marine Corps will
make all Marines proud. However, he is
not so kind to other services, often portraying them as weak willed, unprofessional, even incompetent.

Bradley, James, with Ron Powers. Flags of Our
Fathers. New York: Bantam, 2000. 353pp. $24.95

James Bradley is the son of John “Doc”
Bradley, a Navy corpsman who joined
five Marine brothers-in-arms during the
Herculean struggle to wrest “Sulfur Island” from the Japanese. In the course of
the battle, these six members of “Easy”
Company were memorialized for raising
the American flag, an image captured by
Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize–winning
photograph. Three of the six never returned home—a testimony to the overall
casualty rate of 84 percent for E Company in the thirty-six day conquest of an
island a third the size of Manhattan.

On the northern perimeter of the
Arlington National Cemetery, clearly visible from the adjacent highway, stands a
huge bronze monument embodying perhaps the world’s most famous war
photograph: the flag-raising on Mount
Suribachi during the seizure of Iwo Jima
in February 1945. Flags of Our Fathers,
told by the son of one of the men represented by the figures, is an intensely personal history surrounding this event, a
riveting story guaranteed to evoke emotion in any reader interested in what

The complete story of the flag raising was
never told, because the principals considered the photograph insignificant when
compared to the sacrifice of those who
did not return. Like many of their fellow
veterans, the three survivors adamantly
refused to discuss the details of their war
experiences, even keeping secret their
awards for heroism under fire. Following
his father’s death in 1994, Bradley interviewed the friends and loved ones of all
the men to tell the “real story” behind the
photograph.

RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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The author delights in the pure integrity
and patriotism of his protagonists. Nonetheless, Bradley’s anecdotal evidence
makes a strong case that the principal
source of battlefield bravery has little to
do with national allegiance—it’s your
buddies who count. He wrestles with the
term “heroes”—a title of honor strenuously rejected by all the flag raisers.
There is little doubt, however, where the
author places these men who stood atop
Suribachi, beneath their flag.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Jablonsky, David, ed. Roots of Strategy, Book 4
(Four Military Classics). Mechanicsburg, Penna.:
Stackpole Books, 1999. 533pp. $19.95

In this useful fourth installment of
Stackpole’s “Roots of Strategy” series,
David Jablonsky of the Army War College presents substantial selections from
four classics of strategy: The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, by Alfred Thayer
Mahan; Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy, by Julian S. Corbett; The Command of the Air, by Giulio Douhet; and
Winged Defense, by William Mitchell.
The editor provocatively pairs American
authors with non-Americans writing on
the same subjects and bonds them with
two unifying arguments. Jablonsky contends that all four writers were coping
with monumental technological changes
in warfare and were struggling to reconcile continuity with change, while peering into the future.
The two naval theorists, Mahan of the
United States and Corbett of Great Britain, sought inspiration and guidance for
future warfare in the putatively unchanging principles of the age of sail. The
airpower innovators, Brigadier General
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Mitchell of the U.S. Army and Brigadier
General Douhet of Italy, concluded that
the heavy bomber rendered the study of
past warfare antiquarian and irrelevant to
those planning for future combat.
As an American born in 1879 (one year
before Douglas MacArthur and eleven
years before the “closing of the frontier”),
“Billy” Mitchell remained convinced that
the vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans gave the United States a security
from land invasion unique among great
powers. In the editor’s opinion, Mitchell
consequently was slow to confront
Douhet’s truly horrifying prescription for
mass bombing of cities to pulverize “the
material and moral resources of a people” in order to achieve “the final collapse of all social organization.” For most
of his contentious career, Mitchell envisioned large land-based American bombers primarily as instruments for sinking
enemy warships advancing toward the
American coastline, with fighter aircraft
indispensable for downing long-range
bombers headed for inland U.S. cities,
which were now “as subject to attack as
those along the coast.”
Defense also plays a large role in Sir
Julian Corbett’s 1911 masterwork, Some
Principles of Maritime Strategy, the distillation of a lifetime of careful reflection
upon the age of fighting sail from Drake
to Nelson. A lawyer by training and a minor novelist by avocation, Corbett is the
only author in this volume who never
served in the military. He was, however,
an intimate of Admiral Sir John Fisher,
who presided over the dawn of the age of
the dreadnought.
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
shows a linguist’s familiarity with the figure considered today the Zeus of strategic
thinkers, Carl von Clausewitz. It contains
the best short summary of Clausewitz’s
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